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Abstract
This paper shows that active investors, such as venture capitalists, can aﬀect the
speed at which new ventures grow. In the absence of product market competition,
new ventures ﬁnanced by active investors grow faster initially, though in the long
run those ﬁnanced by passive investors are able to catch up. By contrast, in a
competitive product market, new ventures ﬁnanced by active investors may prey on
rivals that are ﬁnanced by passive investors by “strategically overinvesting” early on,
resulting in long-run diﬀerences in investment, proﬁts, and ﬁrm growth. The value
of active investors is greater in highly competitive industries as well as in industries
with learning curves, economies of scope, and network eﬀects, as is typical for many
“new economy” industries. For such industries, our model predicts that start-ups
with access to venture capital may dominate their industry peers in the long run.
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11. Introduction
Agency problems between entrepreneurs and investors can impair the ﬁnancial viability
of new risky ventures. Actively involved, hands-on investors, such as venture capitalists
(VCs), can mitigate these ineﬃciencies.1 This paper investigates how active investors aﬀect
not so much the ﬁnancial viability of new ventures, but rather the speed at which they
grow. In particular, it examines to what extent higher initial investment and faster early-
stage growth of new ventures ﬁnanced by active investors leads to a long-run competitive
advantage vis-à-vis rivals who are ﬁnanced by passive investors.
Active investors, who through their close involvement can better bridge the informa-
tional gap vis-à-vis entrepreneurs, can respond quicker to new information than passive
investors, leading to an earlier shut-down of less promising ventures and a faster growth
of promising ventures. A key insight of our model is that access to active investors can
constitute a competitive advantage by allowing ﬁrms to “strategically overinvest” early
on, thus forestalling their rivals’ future investment and growth.
W em o d e lad y n a m i ci n v e s t m e n tg a m ei nw h i c he a r l yi n v e s t m e n t sh a v eap e r s i s t e n t
eﬀect on product quality. Our results are reinforced if early investments have additional
long-run beneﬁts, e.g., due to learning curves, economies of scope, and network eﬀects.
In our baseline model, where we abstract from product market competition, promising
ventures ﬁnanced by active investors receive more funding and make higher investments
early on. By contrast, if new ventures are ﬁnanced by passive investors, then growth
proceeds more gradually, and less promising ventures are also kept alive longer.
If new ventures compete with each other on the product market, then those ﬁnanced
by active investors may “prey” on their rivals by “strategically overinvesting” early on.
We show that “strategic overinvestment” is more likely in highly competitive industries.
For such industries, our model predicts that new ventures ﬁnanced by active investors
dominate their industry peers in terms of investment, growth, and market shares. In less
competitive industries, on the other hand, the source of ﬁnancing does not matter in the
long run, as ﬁrms who are ﬁnanced by passive investors will eventually catch up.
While long-run diﬀerences in investment, growth, and proﬁts can arise in our model
1The role of venture capitalists as monitors and hands-on investors has been studied by Kaplan and
Strömberg (2004) and Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002).
2even if ﬁrms have symmetric access to active investors, since in equilibrium some ﬁrms may
endogenously choose passive investors, the case in which some ﬁrms have superior access
to active investors is of particular interest, e.g., to understand diﬀerences between Europe
and the U.S. Though the availability of VC ﬁnancing has increased in Europe over the
last decade (DaRin et al., 2006), “U.S.-style” VCs with specialized industry expertise who
are actively involved in the ﬁrm’s decision making appear to be (still) relatively scarce on
the ground. Using European data, Bottazzi et al. (2007) ﬁnd that it is primarily partners
with prior business experience that become more actively involved. Likewise, Hege et
al. (2007) document that VCs in the U.S. are more “active” and “sophisticated” than
European VCs, while Schwienbacher (2005) ﬁnds that European VCs monitor less than
their U.S. counterparts.
As for the Europe-U.S. comparison, our results regarding the size of VC investments
and the speed at which ﬁrms grow are consistent with ﬁndings by Hege et al. (2007), who
document that VC investments in the U.S. are on average twice as large as in Europe,
and that this translates into long-run diﬀerences in performance.2 The authors also ﬁnd
that VC investments in the U.S. have a shorter average length than in Europe–which
is consistent with our results that active investors are faster to pull the plug on bad
investments–and that VCs in the U.S. “react with an increased funding ﬂow upon good
early performance, in contrast to Europeans” (p. 31).3 Similarly, and also consistent with
our results, Puri and Zarutskie (2007) show that, within in the U.S., VC-backed ﬁrms
make larger investments than their non-VC-backed counterparts.4
Our results suggest that in newly developing industries, in particular those with lit-
tle horizontal diﬀerentiation and substantial ﬁrst-mover advantages, e.g., due to learning
2While Europe has its fair share among the 300 global leaders in terms of R&D expenditures, only two
of the European ﬁrms among the top 300 were created after 1960, while nine of the U.S. ﬁrms among the
top 300 were created after 1990, including Amazon, eBay, and Google.
3See also Bartelsmann et al. (2007) and Aghion et al. (2007), who show that while entry and exit rates
are similar in the U.S. and Europe, successful new ventures grow faster and expand more rapidly in the
U.S. Aghion et al. conclude that “the analysis of ﬁrm dynamics and its links with ﬁnancial development
and other institutional factors cannot only focus on entry, but should also explore the development of new
ventures in the ﬁrst years of their life” (p.8, emphasis added).
4The authors show that this result is not demand-driven in the sense that ﬁrms with larger investment
opportunities might seek more VC ﬁnancing.
3curves, economies of scope, and network eﬀects, the presence of active investors can re-
move barriers to growth in the industry’s early phase. Industries that would satisfy these
criteria are, for example, the communication and information technology industries.
In our model, ﬁnancial contracts between ﬁrms and active investors must ensure that
the active investor acquires information and subsequently implements the eﬃcient invest-
ment path, which may include speeding up the investment. Interestingly, this incentive
problem only imposes a binding constraint on the contract if the investor’s information is
suﬃciently precise. In this case, incentives can be either provided by limiting the active
investor’s discretion over investment decisions or by “front-loading” his compensation by
giving him a suﬃciently large share of the ﬁrm’s early-stage proﬁts.5
Our model is related to the literature on VC contracting, especially that on stage
ﬁnancing, with which it shares the dynamic perspective on investments.6 Given our focus
on the interaction between outside ﬁnancing and product market competition, our model
is also related to the literature on the strategic use of internal versus external ﬁnancing and
debt versus equity ﬁnancing (Brander and Lewis, 1986; Maksimovic, 1988). Finally, it is
related to models studying the role of corporate venturing (Hellmann, 2002) and strategic
alliances (Mathews, 2006) in a competitive context.7
Our model is also related to Ueda (2004) and Winton and Yerramilli (2006), both of
which examine the endogenous choice between active and passive investors. In Ueda’s
model, VCs are better at screening projects ex ante, but they are also more likely to steal
the entrepreneur’s idea. Winton and Yerramilli examine, among other things, the trade-
oﬀ between VCs’ higher funding costs (i.e., liquidity costs) and their superior monitoring
ability. In our model, active investors are beneﬁcial only if they can be induced to acquire
5“Front-loading” in our model can also be interpreted as the retention of early-stage proﬁts and using
them towards future investments, thereby reducing the active investor’s future capital injections.
6For contributions to the VC contracting literature, see Hellmann (1998), Casamatta (2003), Inderst
and Mueller (2003), and Repullo and Suarez (2004). In the stage ﬁnancing literature, staging is typically
interpreted as a short-term ﬁnancial contract giving the VC control over the continuation decision, which
alleviates agency problems (Neher, 1999; Cornelli and Yosha, 2003).
7Cestone and White (2003) consider the ﬁnancing of competing ventures through a single investor.
Inderst and Mueller (2003) consider competition among start-ups for VC ﬁnancing in the capital market,
while Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003), Fulghieri and Sevilir (2005), and Inderst et al. (2007) consider
competition among portfolio companies of the same VC for the VC’s scarce resources.
4information, which is costly. While the cost-beneﬁt analysis of banks versus VCs is richer
in Winton and Yerramilli’s model, our model considers the interaction between outside
ﬁnancing, investment, and product market competition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 examine the baseline
model without competition. In Section 4, we embed our model in a competitive product
market. Section 5 considers various extensions. Section 6 discusses empirical implications.
Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Investment and the value of information
As a benchmark, we consider ﬁrst the investment decision of a single, wealthy, and
risk-neutral entrepreneur. In Section 3, we relax the assumption that the entrepreneur
is wealthy. In Section 4, we relax the assumption that there is a single entrepreneur by
considering a strategic ﬁnancing game between two start-ups. The entrepreneur has a new
venture that requires an initial investment of I0 in t =0 . The venture’s product is sold
o nt h em a r k e tb o t hi nt =1and t =2 . At these dates, the ﬁrm can make additional
investments of I1 and I2, respectively.
The venture’s success depends, next to I1 and I2, on the state of nature θ,w h i c hc a nb e
either “bad” (θ = b) or “good” (θ = g). Prior beliefs about θ are given by μ0 =P r ( θ = g),
where 0 <μ 0 < 1.I nt =1 , before making the investment I1, the entrepreneur receives
as i g n a ls ∈ {b,g} about θ. The signal is only informative with probability ψ>0, while
with probability 1 − ψ it constitutes pure noise. Posterior beliefs about θ after observing
s ∈ {b,g} are given by
μg :=
μ0(1 + ψ)
μ0(1 + ψ)+( 1− μ0)(1 − ψ)
(1)
and
μb :=
μ0(1 − ψ)
μ0(1 − ψ)+( 1− μ0)(1 + ψ)
. (2)
The investments I1 and I2 determine the product’s quality, which for the time being
can be either “low” (q = l)o r“ h i g h ”( q = h). Ignoring competition for the moment,
we assume that quality q gives rise to a (representative) consumer’s utility of uq,w h e r e
uh >u l > 0. To simplify the notation, we set u := uh−ul = ul, where u is a constant utility
increment. Positive utility is realized only if θ = g. If θ = b, the product fails, e.g., because
5it is technologically infeasible.8 The parameter Λt > 0 denotes the market size given that
θ = g.T h eﬁrm’s proﬁts (gross of investment costs) are Vt := utΛt.I m p o r t a n t l y ,a sV1 is
observable and V1 > 0 only if θ = g, the state of nature θ is perfectly known after t =1
and thus before the second-period investment I2 is made.
To produce quality q1, the ﬁrm must invest I1 = Kq1,w h e r eKh >K l > 0.I n c r e m e n t a l
investment costs are denoted by κh := Kh−Kl and κl := Kl. Given that utility increments
are constant, we assume (weakly) increasing incremental investment costs: κh ≥ κl.W e
also assume that product quality does not deteriorate over time, capturing the “persis-
tency” of early investments. For example, if the ﬁrm invests I1 = κl + κh and I2 =0 , the
quality is qt = h both in t =1and t =2 .
The ﬁrm’s choices in t =1and t =2a r et h u sa sf o l l o w s :i )d i s c o n t i n u et h ev e n t u r e
in t =1b yi n v e s t i n gz e r ob o t hi nt =1and t =2 ; ii) invest I1 = κl and I2 =0 ,t h u s
producing quality q1 = q2 = l both in t =1and t =2 ; iii) pursue a gradual investment
path by investing I1 = κl and I2 = κh, thus producing quality q1 = l in t =1and q2 = h
in t =2 ; iv) speed up the investment by investing I1 = κl +κh and I2 =0 , thus producing
quality q1 = q2 = h both in t =1and t =2 .
We ﬁrst characterize the eﬃcient investment path if the signal is uninformative (ψ =0 ) .
Clearly, if it is ex-ante eﬃcient to invest I0, then it must also be eﬃcient to continue the
venture in t =1by investing at least I1 = κl.9 To make the subsequent analysis when
the signal is informative interesting, we assume that it is eﬃcient to pursue a gradual
investment path when the signal is uninformative. The conditions for this are as follows.
Investing I2 = κh is eﬃcient if
Λ2u>κ h, (3)
while, provided that condition (3) holds, investing I1 = κl is eﬃcient if
μ0 (Λ1u +2 Λ2u − κh) − κl >μ 02(Λ1 + Λ2)u − κl − κh. (4)
8Ex-ante uncertainty about the market’s potential might allow for a diﬀerent interpretation. However,
interpreting the state of nature in terms of the product’s technological feasibility allows us to assume later
that competing ventures face the same (technological) uncertainty.
9We postpone a formal speciﬁcation of the requirement that the venture is ex-ante proﬁtable. This
requirement will be implied later by the investor’s break-even constraint.
6This can be rearranged as
μ0
1 − μ0
<
κh
Λ1u
. (5)
To characterize the eﬃcient investment path for general ψ, we ﬁr s td e t e r m i n et h ee ﬃcient
decision rule based on the updated belief μs in t =1 .
Lemma 1 There are two thresholds 0 <μ 0 <μ 00 < 1 for posterior beliefs μs such that:
i) If μs ≤ μ0 it is eﬃcient to discontinue the venture in t =1 .
ii) If μ0 ≤ μs ≤ μ00 it is eﬃcient to pursue a gradual investment path by investing κl in
t =1and, provided that θ = g is realized, κh in t =2 .
iii) If μs ≥ μ00 it is eﬃcient to speed up the investment by investing κl + κh in t =1and
zero in t =2 .
Throughout this paper, the disclaimer “provided that θ = g is realized” implies a zero
investment in t =2if θ = g is not realized, i.e., if instead θ = b is realized. If the signal’s
precision ψ is suﬃciently high, posterior beliefs satisfy μb <μ 0 and μg >μ 00. By Lemma
1, it is then optimal to either discontinue the venture in t =1(if s = b is observed) or
invest I1 = κl+κh (if s = g is observed). Compared to the case where ψ =0 ,as u ﬃciently
precise signal thus allows to improve the investment decision both by discontinuing the
venture after bad news and speeding up the investment after good news. Moreover, when
μ0 is not too large (see the threshold derived in the Proof of Proposition 1), then, for
intermediate values of ψ, only a bad signal changes the investment path relative to the
benchmark case in which the signal is uninformative.10 As our primary interest lies with
risky ventures that have relatively little chance of success ex ante, as is typically the case
in venture capital ﬁnance, we shall henceforth focus on this case.
Proposition 1 There are two thresholds 0 <ψ
0 <ψ
00 < 1 for the signal’s precision ψ
such that:
i) If ψ ≤ ψ
0 it is eﬃcient to pursue a gradual investment path by investing κl in t =1and,
provided that θ = g is realized, κh in t =2 ;
ii) If ψ
0 <ψ<ψ
00 it is eﬃcient to discontinue the venture in t =1after observing s = b
and to pursue a gradual investment path after observing s = g.
10If instead μ0 was large, then, for intermediary values of ψ, only a good signal would change the
investment path relative to the benchmark case in which the signal is uninformative.
7iii) If ψ ≥ ψ
00 it is eﬃcient to discontinue the venture in t =1after observing s = b and
to speed up the investment after observing s = g by investing κl + κh in t =1 .
Based on Proposition 1, we can characterize the ex-ante value of information.
Corollary 1 The value of information (in the form of the signal) is as follows. If ψ ≤ ψ
0
the value of information is zero, if ψ
0 <ψ<ψ
00 the value from discontinuing the venture
after observing s = b is
1
2
(1 − μ0)(1 + ψ)
∙
κl −
μ0
1 − μ0
1 − ψ
1+ψ
(Λ1u +2 Λ2u − κl − κh)
¸
, (6)
and if ψ ≥ ψ
00 the value from speeding up the investment after observing s = g is
1
2
μ0(1 + ψ)
µ
Λ1u −
1 − μ0
μ0
1 − ψ
1+ψ
κh
¶
. (7)
Note that the respective conditions ψ
0 <ψ<ψ
00 and ψ ≥ ψ
00 ensure that (6) and (7)
are both positive. Note also that the total value of information if ψ ≥ ψ
00 is the sum of
(6) and (7). Intuitively, from (6) we have that the value from discontinuing the venture
in t =1is higher the larger is the (otherwise lost) capital outlay κl, while from (7) we
have that the value from speeding up the investment is higher the larger is the ﬁrm’s
incremental ﬁrst-period proﬁt Λ1u.
3. Outside ﬁnancing: active versus passive investors
3.1. Extension of the model
To provide a role for outside ﬁnancing, we now assume that the entrepreneur is pen-
niless. Outside ﬁnancing is provided by competitive risk-neutral investors, whose cost of
capital is normalized to zero.
In t =1 , before the investment I1 is sunk, some investors can obtain information about
the state of nature θ at private (monitoring) cost of k>0.11 We refer to such investors
as “active investors” and denote their signals by sA ∈ {b,g}, which are obtained with
precision ψA > 0. To avoid confusion, we denote the entrepreneur’s signal by sE,w h i c hi s
obtained with precision ψE. Investors who cannot obtain information about θ, e.g., because
11Recall that the state of nature θ becomes perfectly known after t =1 . The beneﬁto fh a v i n gi n f o r -
mation about θ already in t =1is that it can be used to improve the decision regarding I1.
8they lack expertise, are called “passive investors.” (Alternatively, passive investors could
be viewed as having a completely uninformative signal.)
Venture capitalists can provide active support in numerous ways (see Introduction).
In our setting, besides providing capital infusions at diﬀerent stages, active investors can
obtain valuable information. Even if this information is less precise than that of the
entrepreneur, it is valuable as the entrepreneur cannot be trusted to make an unbiased
decision once he receives outside funding. This is because we assume that he derives private
beneﬁts from larger investments. Precisely, we assume that for every dollar invested, the
entrepreneur receives arbitrarily small private beneﬁts of γ.
Assuming that γ is arbitrarily small allows us to conveniently ignore the entrepreneur’s
private beneﬁts both when determining the eﬃcient investment path and when deriving
the ﬁrm’s optimal choice of ﬁnancing. If γ was non-negligible, then this would aﬀect the
speciﬁc threshold values in Proposition 1 as well as the value of information in Corollary
1. However, it would not qualitatively aﬀect our analysis. Note, in particular, that since
the private beneﬁts cannot be shared with the investor, they would not relax the investor’s
break-even constraint.12
As is standard in the ﬁnancial contracting literature, we assume that payments to the
(penniless) entrepreneur can only be made if the venture is successful.13 It is also obvious
that payments exceeding the venture’s proﬁts are never optimal. A ﬁnancial contract
thus stipulates that the investor receives a share 0 ≤ σt ≤ 1 of the venture’s proﬁts
Λtuqt. As investments are veriﬁable, a ﬁnancial contract could, in principle, also specify
an investment path, possibly contingent on θ (in case of I2) and the entrepreneur’s signal
12If γ was non-negligible, condition (3) would be relaxed given that investing I2 = κh would now be
eﬃcient if Λ2u>κ h(1 − γ). Furthermore, even though the entrepreneur does not derive larger private
beneﬁts if a given investment is undertaken earlier, if the decision to speed up the investment in t =1
must be made under uncertainty (if ψ<1), then assuming a non-negligible value of γ would also aﬀect the
choice between κl and κl+κh in t =1and thus condition (5) as well as the threshold ψ
00 in Proposition 1.
Precisely, replacing κh by κh(1 −γ) would result in a lower value of ψ
00. By contrast, the other threshold
in Proposition 1, ψ
0, would increase, given that the cost of (wrongly) sinking κl to keep the venture alive
is lower if the entrepreneur derives private beneﬁts from investing.
13The common justiﬁcation for this assumption is that non-state contingent payments would attract
“fake” entrepreneurs who have no real projects (so-called “ﬂy-by-night” operators).
9(precisely, his message).14 As we will show below, there is no need not spell out the
mechanism-design problem in detail, as the best feasible choice can be implemented in a
simple fashion.
3.2. Analysis
We ﬁrst consider the case in which the venture is ﬁnanced by a passive investor. In
principle, investment decisions could be made contingent on the entrepreneur’s private
signal (precisely, his message). This is, however, not feasible. In order to elicit truthful
information from the entrepreneur that would change the ﬁrm’s investment path (relative
to the gradual investment path that is eﬃcient if no signal is available), the entrepreneur
would have to be rewarded for revealing bad news, since he obtains private beneﬁts from
larger investments. As his compensation can only be tied to the venture’s success, how-
ever, no such reward is incentive compatible, because it would also be preferred by an
entrepreneur with a good signal. If ψA =0 , a gradual investment path is thus the most
eﬃcient outcome that can be achieved. In this case, any set of sharing rules {σ1,σ 2} that
satisﬁes the passive investor’s break-even constraint
μ0 (σ1Λ1u +2 σ2Λ2u − κh) − κl ≥ I0 (8)
with equality is optimal. We assume that the venture is suﬃciently proﬁtable such that
(8) holds strictly for σ1 = σ2 =1 .
Proposition 2 A ﬁrm ﬁnanced by a passive investor pursues a gradual investment path.
We next consider the case in which the venture is ﬁnanced by an active investor. Like
above, the entrepreneur’s signal cannot be relied upon.15 Recall from Corollary 1 that the
value of information is zero if the signal’s precision is low (ψA ≤ ψ
0). On the other hand, if
ψA >ψ
0, it is eﬃcient to induce the active investor to acquire information if the associated
cost k is not too large. By Corollary 1, if ψ
0 <ψ<ψ
00, this is the case if k is less than
(6), while if ψ ≥ ψ
00, i ti st h ec a s ei fk is less than the sum of (6) and (7).
14Likewise, the sharing rules σt could also condition on the entrepreneur’s message, next to θ and It.
15That the entrepreneur is penniless and that payments can only be made if the venture is successful
again rules out any incentive-compatible mechanism that would implement a lower I1 for sE = b than for
sE = g, even if such a mechanism could additionally condition on the active investor’s message.
10T h ec a s ew h e r eψ
0 <ψ A <ψ
00 mirrors that with a passive investor in that any set
of sharing rules {σ1,σ2} that satisﬁes with equality the active investor’s break-even con-
straint, which is now
μ0
1+ψA
2
(σ1Λ1u + σ22Λ2u − κl − κh) − (1 − μ0)
1 − ψA
2
κl ≥ I0 + k, (9)
is also optimal. Any such contract induces the active investor to acquire information at
private cost k and to implement the eﬃcient investment path. As for intuition, recall from
Case ii) of Proposition 1 that eﬃciency dictates that the venture should be discontinued
if sA = b is observed. Given that the investor fully funds the investment out of his own
pocket, he has no incentives to continue unless this is also eﬃcient. If ψ
0 <ψ A <ψ
00, the
role of information acquisition is thus primarily protective from the investor’s viewpoint,
namely, to avoid sinking I1 = κl of his own funds if the venture is unlikely to succeed,
w h i c hi sa l s ow h yh eh a sa d e q u a t ei n c e n t i v e st oa c q u i r ei n f o r m a t i o ni nt h eﬁrst place.
If ψA ≥ ψ
00, eﬃciency dictates that the active investor should speed up the investment
after observing sA = g. There are two ways how to make this privately optimal for the
active investor. The ﬁrst is to limit the investor’s discretion by requiring that he invests
either I1 =0or I1 = κl + κh but not I1 = κl. As can be shown (see Proof of Proposition
3 below), investing only I1 = κl would be the active investor’s preferred choice had he
not acquired information. Intuitively, it is easier to induce the active investor to acquire
information if his subsequent choice set is limited to precisely those values of I1 that are
optimal if and only if he acquired information. Given this limitation on the active investor’s
discretion, any set of sharing rules {σ1,σ 2} that satisﬁes his break-even constraint
μ0
1+ψA
2
(σ12Λ1u + σ22Λ2u − κl − κh) − (1 − μ0)
1 − ψA
2
(κl + κh) ≥ I0 + k (10)
also induces the active investor to both acquire information and implement the eﬃcient
investment path from Case iii) of Proposition 1.
The second way is to give the active investor full discretion over the investment decision
while making a judicious choice of the sharing rules. To make it privately optimal for the
active investor to speed up the investment after observing sA = g, he has to be given a
suﬃciently large fraction σ1 of the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-period proﬁts Λ1u. Formally, it is shown in
the Proof of Proposition 3 that σ1 must satisfy
σ1 ≥
κh
Λ1u
1 − μ0
μ0
1 − ψA
1+ψA
. (11)
11Incidentally, increasing σ1 while reducing σ2 to satisfy (10) with equality also relaxes the
active investor’s incentive constraint to acquire information in the ﬁr s tp l a c e .A si ss h o w n
in the Proof of Proposition 3, the active investor acquires information if
μ0 [σ1ψAΛ1u − σ2(1 − ψA)Λ2u] ≥ k+κh
1
2
(1−ψA)(1− 2μ0)−κl
1
2
(1 + ψA − 2μ0ψA), (12)
where the left-hand side is increasing in σ1 and decreasing in σ2.
Proposition 3 Inducing information acquisition by an active investor is optimal if either
ψ
0 <ψ<ψ
00 and k is less than (6) or if ψ ≥ ψ
00 and k is less than the sum of (6) and
(7). In the ﬁrst case, any set of sharing rules that allows the active investor to break even
also ensures that he acquires information and implements the eﬃcient investment path. In
the second case, it is furthermore necessary to either limit the active investor’s discretion
to investments I1 ∈ {0,κ l + κh} or to “front-load” his compensation by increasing σ1 and
decreasing σ2 so that (11) and (12) are jointly satisﬁed.
Throughout this paper, we assume that if active investors remain equally uninformed
as passive investors (e.g., because k is too high), then the entrepreneur turns to a passive
investor. This assumption could be endogenized by assuming that active investors, such
as venture capitalists, have marginally higher funding costs (e.g., Winton and Yerramilli,
2006). Likewise, active investors could be more scarce than passive investors, allowing
them to require a higher rate of return.
4. Strategic ﬁnancing and investment when ﬁrms compete with each other in
the product market
4.1. Extension of the model
We now extend our model by introducing a competitive product market in t =2 . We
s p e c i f yt h a ta tm o s tt w ov e n t u r e sn = a,b can be started in t =0 . Both ventures require
t h es a m ei n i t i a li n v e s t m e n tI0 and the same follow-up investments I1 and I2 to produce a
given product quality qt. Likewise, technological uncertainty, as captured by the state of
nature θ, aﬀects both ventures in the same way.
To capture the idea that markets evolve gradually, we assume that initially, in t =1 ,
ﬁrms act as monopolists in their own local markets, generating proﬁts of Λn
1un
t in case θ = g
12is realized, where we abbreviate a (representative) consumer’s utility from quality qn
t by un
t .
Subsequently, in t =2 , ﬁrms compete in a “global” market, where we model competition
using a standard Hotelling framework, although we make only use of properties of the
competition game that also hold more generally (see below).
With regard to the competition game, suppose that in t =2the mass 2Λ2 of consumers
is uniformly distributed over a unit interval, with the two ﬁrms n = a,b being located at
the respective endpoints. By specifying a market of size 2Λ2, we make our analysis directly
comparable to the case without competition, where the market size was Λ2 for each ﬁrm.
A consumer with “location” 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, which is either in geographic space or in the
space of preferences over product characteristics, derives net utility ua
2 − pa
2 − τx from
purchasing a good from ﬁrm a at price pa
2 in t =2 . Here, τ>0 is a measure of horizontal
product diﬀerentiation. If the same consumer purchases from ﬁrm b, he derives net utility
of ub
2 − pb
2 − τ(1 − x).
If both ﬁrms have positive market shares, then it is well known that in t =2ﬁrm n
realizes equilibrium proﬁts of
π
n =
Λ2
τ
µ
τ +
un
2 − un0
2
3
¶2
. (13)
Diﬀerentiating (13) shows that the beneﬁts to ﬁrm n from a marginal increase in un
2 are
2
3τ
Λ2
µ
τ +
un
2 − un0
2
3
¶
, (14)
which is increasing in un
2 and decreasing in un0
2 . Hence, a ﬁrm’s proﬁts in t =2are
convex in the quality of its own products, while the marginal beneﬁts from producing
higher quality by making larger investments are decreasing in the quality of its rival’s
products. These features are key for our analysis and hold for most standard models
of product diﬀerentiation (see Athey and Schmutzler, 2001). Note also that as ﬁrms’
products become less horizontally diﬀerentiated (i.e.,
¯ ¯ua
2 − ub
2
¯ ¯ decreases), product market
competition intensiﬁes, resulting in lower total industry proﬁts.
We enrich our model further by introducing an additional investment level, and thus
an additional product quality. By investing κH in addition to κl +κh,aﬁrm can produce
quality q = H with consumer surplus 3u.( R e c a l l t h a t i f a ﬁrm produces quality q = h
(q = l) by investing κl + κh (κl) the consumer surplus is 2u (u). We assume that
κH > (Λ1 + Λ2)u, (15)
13which ensures that quality q = H would never be optimal in our previously analyzed
setting without competition. We also assume that
2u<3τ (16)
to ensure that both ﬁr m sh a v ep o s i t i v em a r k e ts h a r e sf o ra l li n v e s t m e n tl e v e l sIn
2 > 0.16
4.2. Analysis
We ﬁrst specify exogenously whether a ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by an active or passive investor.
In Section 4.2.2, we endogenize the choice of outside ﬁnancing. We assume that ﬁnancial
contracts are not observable by competitors, thus ruling out their use as a strategic com-
mitment device. To keep the analysis simple, we ﬁrst assume that the active investor’s
signal is fully informative (ψA =1 ) . In Section 4.3, we extend our results to the case with
ψA < 1. Finally, we replace condition (3) with the stronger condition17
1
2
Λ2u>κ h. (17)
4.2.1. Exogenous choice of outside ﬁnancing
Given that we specify exogenously whether a ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by an active investor,
we must set k suﬃciently small to ensure that it is optimal to induce the active investor
to acquire information. For simplicity, we set k =0 . When we endogenize the choice of
outside ﬁnancing below, we will naturally assume that k>0.
If both ﬁrms are ﬁnanced by active investors, the investment game unfolds in t =1 .
Analogous to the case without competition, provided that sA = g is observed, there always
exists a symmetric equilibrium in which both ﬁrms invest κl + κh in t =1and zero in
t =2 , thus producing quality q1 = q2 = h both in t =1and t =2 . There exist no other
symmetric equilibria. However, for some parameter values, there additionally exist two
asymmetric equilibria.
16Both ﬁrms have strictly positive market shares if and only if
¯ ¯ ¯un
2 − un0
2
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ 3τ.G i v e nt h a tun
2,u n0
2 ∈
{u,2u,3u}, this transforms to (16).
17That (17) is stronger than (3) follows intuitively from the observation that under competition a higher
quality choice is less proﬁtable if a ﬁrm expects its rival to also choose a higher quality. On the other
hand, we need not strengthen condition (5), as it refers to payoﬀsi nt =1 ,w h e r eﬁrms still operate in
their own local markets.
14Lemma 2 Suppose both ﬁrms are ﬁnanced by active investors. There always exists a
symmetric equilibrium in which, provided that sA = g is observed, both ﬁrms invest κl+κh
in t =1a n dz e r oi nt =2 . If
κh ≥ Λ1u + Λ2u
1
3τ
(2τ − u) (18)
and
κH ≤ Λ1u + Λ2u
4
9τ
(u +3 τ) (19)
there additionally exist two asymmetric equilibria in which, provided that sA = g is ob-
served, one ﬁrm invests κl + κh + κH and the other ﬁrm invests κl in t =1 , while both
ﬁrms invest zero in t =2 .
As for the two asymmetric equilibria, conditions (18) and (19) ensure that neither the
“investment leader”, who invests κl + κh + κH in t =1 , nor its rival, who invests only κl,
want to deviate to the symmetric equilibrium level of κl + κh. Intuitively, this imposes
both a lower boundary on κh a n da nu p p e rb o u n d a r yo nκH.18 However, picking one of the
ﬁr m sa st h e“ i n v e s t m e n tl e a d e r ” ,w h o s ep r o ﬁts are strictly larger than those of its rival,
seems arbitrary given that both ﬁrms face identical ﬁnancing conditions. In what follows,
we thus impose as a reﬁnement the requirement that if both ﬁrms face identical ﬁnancing
conditions, then the equilibrium outcome should also be symmetric. Note also that when
we endogenize the choice of outside ﬁnancing below, assuming that k>0, t h ec a s ei n
which identical ﬁnancing conditions result in an asymmetric equilibrium would never arise
for all but very small values of k.
Consider next the case in which only one ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by an active investor. Given
the reluctance of the passive investor to commit more capital early on than what is ab-
solutely necessary (because he does not observe a signal), the ﬁrm ﬁnanced by an active
investor has an endogenous ﬁrst-mover advantage. It will strategically exploit this advan-
tage if investing κl + κh + κH early on makes it unproﬁtable for its rival to step up its
investment later, implying the outcome remains asymmetric also in the long run. While
such an “overinvestment strategy” would not pay if the rival were to invest κl + κh early
on (as in Lemma 2), the fact that the rival (who is ﬁnanced by a passive investor) invests
18Note that (19) is compatible with the lower boundary imposed on κH in condition (15) if 4
9τ [u +3 τ] >
1 holds, which is ensured by (16).
15only κl renders this strategy proﬁtable. The outcome is a long-run asymmetry between
the two ﬁrms in terms of total investment, market shares, and proﬁts.
Formally, recall from (14) that the beneﬁts from producing high quality are smaller if
the other ﬁrm also produces high quality. By committing to the highest quality q = H
early on, a ﬁrm that is ﬁnanced by an active investor can forestall any future investment
by its rival if
κh ≥ Λ2u
1
3τ
(2τ − u). (20)
If (20) does not hold, the “overinvestment strategy” does not work, as the rival would then
invest κh in t =2despite the high initial investment of κl + κh + κH by the “investment
leader”, and despite the fact that the additional investment of κh only bears fruit in the
second period. But if (20) holds and κH i sn o tt o ol a r g es ot h a t( 1 9 )i ss a t i s ﬁed, then an
equilibrium exists that features a long-run asymmetric outcome.
Lemma 3 Suppose ﬁrm n is ﬁnanced by an active investor, while its rival, ﬁrm n0, is
ﬁnanced by a passive investor.
Case i): If either (19) or (20) does not hold, then there exists an equilibrium in which,
provided that θ = g,b o t hﬁrms end up with the same total investment κl + κh, product
quality q = h, and market share in the long run, though ﬁrm n makes all of its investments
in t =1 , while ﬁrm n0 pursues a gradual investment path.
Case ii): If both (19) and (20) hold, then there exists an equilibrium in which, provided
that sA = g is observed, ﬁrm n “strategically overinvests” early on by investing κl+κh+κH
in t =1a n dz e r oi nt =2 , while ﬁrm n0 invests κl in t =1a n dz e r oi nt =2 .
We show in the Proof of Lemma 3 that there may also exist other equilibria in which
the rival ﬁrm invests more than κl in t =1 . However, the range of parameters for which
such equilibria exist is small. A suﬃcient set of conditions to rule out these equilibria is
that
κH > Λ2u
1
3τ
(u +2 τ) (21)
and
μ0 <
3
4
2τ + u
3τ + u
. (22)
If these conditions hold, then there exist no equilibria besides those characterized in Lemma
3.19 We will assume throughout that both conditions hold. Note that condition (21) is
19Note that (21) is compatible with (19) even if Λ1 =0 .
16relatively mild, given that a lower boundary on κH is already obtained from (15). Likewise,
condition (22) conforms well with our previous restriction to investments that have little
chance of success ex ante,a si sr e ﬂected in our assumption that μ0 is small. (If μ0 < 1/2,
condition (22) is always satisﬁed.) Intuitively, conditions (21) and (22) ensure that it is
too costly for a ﬁrm ﬁnanced by a passive investor to make a high investment early on,
given that the passive investor (who does not observe a signal) must make this investment
under a considerable degree of uncertainty.
We ﬁnally consider the case in which both ﬁrms are ﬁnanced by passive investors.
In this case, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium that mirrors the case without
competition.
Lemma 4 If both ﬁrms are ﬁnanced by passive investors, then they both pursue a gradual
investment path.
4.2.2. Endogenous choice of outside ﬁnancing
With Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 at hand, we can now, in analogy to the case without com-
petition, determine the beneﬁts of ﬁnancing by an active investor. If ﬁrms compete in the
product market, the active investor’s information entails an additional beneﬁt, namely, it
may allow a ﬁrm to credibly commit to “strategically overinvest” early on to forestall a
rival’s future investment or to protect itself from a similar strategic move by a rival.
4.2.2.1. Asymmetric access to outside ﬁnancing
We ﬁrst consider the case in which only one ﬁrm has access to active investors, while
the other ﬁrm has only access to passive investors. For example, active investors may
be regionally clustered, while at the same time local proximity may be key for the active
investor’s close involvement with the ﬁrm.
If either (19) or (20) does not hold, then ﬁnancing by an active investor has no strategic
value. Consequently, the value of choosing an active investor is the same as without
competition and thus, by Corollary 1 (using ψ =1 ), given by
(1 − μ0)κl + μ0Λ1u. (23)
Conversely, if both (19) and (20) hold, then ﬁnancing by an active investor has an addi-
tional strategic value.
17Proposition 4 Suppose ﬁrm a has access to active investors, while ﬁrm b has only access
to passive investors. If either (19) or (20) does not hold, then ﬁrm a chooses an active
investor if the value of information in (23) exceeds k. In the long run, both ﬁrms have
then the same total investment, market shares, and proﬁts. If instead both (19) and (20)
hold, then ﬁrm a chooses an active investor if
(1 − μ0)κl + μ0
∙
2Λ1u − κH + Λ2u
4
9τ
(u +3 τ)
¸
(24)
exceeds k, in which case ﬁrm a has a higher total investment, market share, and proﬁts in
the long run.
By inspection, an increase in the utility increment u increases both (23) and (24).
Hence, regardless of whether (19) and (20) hold, an increase in u makes it more likely that
ﬁrm a chooses ﬁnancing by an active investor. Intuitively, given that product quality is
persistent, an increase in u increases the foregone proﬁts from investing late. In addition,
an increase in u reinforces the additional strategic value of ﬁnancing by an active investor,
which is reﬂe c t e di nt h ef a c tt h a tt h ed i ﬀerence between (23) and (24) is increasing in u.
Recall also that the other (non-strategic) beneﬁt of early information is to avoid sinking
κl if the venture is unpromising. This beneﬁti si n c r e a s i n gi nκl. Furthermore, the beneﬁt
of early information is also increasing in the ﬁrst-period market size Λ1. In contrast to an
increase in u, however, this eﬀect is the same regardless of whether the long-run outcome
is symmetric or asymmetric. An increase in the second-period market size Λ2 or a decrease
in κH, on the other hand, only increase the value of ﬁnancing by an active investor if this
creates a long-run strategic advantage, in which case it allows the ﬁrm to seize at lower
costs a larger share of what has become a larger market.
Corollary 2 Suppose ﬁrm a has access to active investors, while ﬁrm b has only access to
passive investors. Regardless of whether the long-run outcome is asymmetric or symmetric,
ﬁrm a is more likely to choose an active investor (i.e., also for higher values of k) if either
u, Λ1, or κl increases, albeit the eﬀect of an increase in u is stronger if the long-run
outcome is asymmetric. In the latter case, ﬁrm a is also more likely to choose an active
investor if either Λ2 increases or κH decreases.
The results in Corollary 2 come with the caveat that an asymmetric long-run outcome
18becomes itself less likely as either u or Λt increases (see condition (20)).20 On the other
hand, an asymmetric long-run outcome is more likely if competition in the product market
is more intense (lower τ). This makes it more likely that both (19) and (20) hold and
thus that ﬁnancing by an active investor has a strategic value. Moreover, an increase in
competition also makes it more likely that (24) exceeds k.
Corollary 3 Suppose ﬁrm a has access to active investors, while ﬁrm b has only access to
passive investors. As product market competition becomes more intense, it becomes more
likely that ﬁrm a has a long-run advantage over ﬁrm b.
This comparative statics result, which also holds if both ﬁrms have access to active
investors (see below), is one of the main results of this paper. If product market compe-
tition becomes more intense, the ﬁrms’ products become less horizontally diﬀerentiated,
and it becomes more likely that one ﬁrm has an (endogenous) ﬁrst-mover advantage by
“strategically overinvesting” early on, thus forestalling the other ﬁrm’s future investment,
growth, and market share.
4.2.2.2. Symmetric access to outside ﬁnancing
We next consider the case in which both ﬁrms have access to active investors. As in
Proposition 4, there are again two cases. The ﬁrst case is:
Proposition 5 Suppose both ﬁrms have access to active investors. If either (19) or (20)
does not hold, then both ﬁrms choose active investors if the value of information in (23)
exceeds k. The outcome is then symmetric both in the short and long run.
The second case is that in which (19) and (20) hold, so that ﬁnancing by an active
investor has an additional strategic value. As in Proposition 4, if only one ﬁrm chooses
an active investor, then the value added is given by (24). Unlike Proposition 4, however,
where only one ﬁrm has access to active investors, choosing an active investor may now
entail an additional (“defensive”) value if a ﬁrm anticipates that its rival would otherwise
20Ac h a n g ei nκh does not aﬀect the value of information, and thus the choice between active and passive
investors, albeit an increase in κh relaxes condition (20), making an asymmetric outcome more likely if
ﬁrms a and b choose diﬀerent investor types.
19“strategically overinvest”. Formally, the value of choosing an active investor given that
the other ﬁrm also chooses an active investor is21
(1 − μ0)κl + μ0
∙
Λ1u − κh + Λ2u
4
9τ
(3τ − u)
¸
. (25)
Comparing (24) with (25), we have that (24) is larger than (25) if
κH − κh ≤ u
µ
Λ1 + Λ2
8u
9τ
¶
. (26)
Condition (26) is necessary for an asymmetric equilibrium to exist, both in terms of ﬁ-
nancing choices and long-run outcomes. The following result is then immediate.
Proposition 6 Suppose both ﬁrms have access to active investors. If (19), (20), and (26)
hold, then both ﬁrms choose either passive investors (if k is higher than (24)) or active
investors (if k is lower than (25)). In either case, the outcome is symmetric both in the
short and long run. If k lies between (25) and (24), then only one ﬁrm chooses an active
investor. This ﬁrm then has a long-run advantage over its rival.
Similar to the case in which only one ﬁrm has access to active investors, an asymmetric
long-run outcome is more likely if product market competition is more intense (lower τ).
This is because an increase in competition increases (24) and decreases (25) while relaxing
conditions (19), (20), and (26).
Corollary 4 Suppose both ﬁrms have access to active investors. As product market compe-
tition becomes more intense, it becomes more likely that one ﬁrm has a long-run advantage
over its rival.
Corollary 4 mirrors the result in Corollary 2 in that an asymmetric outcome becomes
unambiguously more likely as product market competition becomes more intense. The
same is not true for the comparative statics results in Corollary 3. Precisely, as the
value of ﬁnancing by an active investor increases, because either u, Λt, or κl increases,
the outcome in which both ﬁrms choose passive investors becomes less likely, while the
outcome in which both ﬁrms choose active investors becomes more likely.
21Given that the other ﬁrm chooses an active investor, a ﬁrm’s second-period proﬁti fi ta l s oc h o o s e sa n
active investor is Λ2τ, while otherwise it is only Λ2
τ
¡
τ − 2u
3
¢2 (see equation (13)).
20It remains to analyze the case in which (19) and (20) hold but (26) does not hold, which
implies that (24) is smaller than (25). Intuitively, any equilibrium must be symmetric.
What is perhaps not so obvious is that there may exist multiple equilibria if k lies between
(24) and (25). In this case, both ﬁrms would prefer not to be ﬁnanced by an active
investor, having to compensate him for his information acquisition cost. However, if one
ﬁrm is expected to choose an active investor, then it becomes optimal for the other ﬁrm
to do the same. These equilibria can be ruled out using the standard equilibrium selection
criterion of Pareto dominance.
Proposition 7 Suppose both ﬁrms have access to active investors. If (19) and (20) hold
but (26) does not hold, then both ﬁrms choose either passive investors (if k is higher than
(24)) or active investors (if k is lower than (24)). In either case, the outcome is symmetric
both in the short and long run.
4.3. Imperfectly informative signals
We ﬁnally consider the case in which the active investors’ signal is only imperfectly
informative (ψA < 1).22 We restrict attention to the case in which it is eﬃcient to speed
up investment after observing a good signal. This is the case if ψA ≥ ψ
00,w h e r eψ
00 is
characterized in equation (35) in the Proof of Proposition 1. Accordingly, we assume that
ψA ≥ ψ
00, where
1+ψ
00
1 − ψ
00 =
1 − μ0
μ0
κh
Λ1u
. (27)
Analogous to Section 4, we ﬁrst specify exogenously whether a ﬁrm receives ﬁnancing
by an active or passive investor. Suppose ﬁrst that, as in Lemma 2, both ﬁrms are ﬁnanced
by active investors. Like before, the outcome then mirrors that without competition in
that both ﬁrms invest In
1 = κl + κh if sA = g is observed and zero otherwise.23 Since this
holds for all ψA ≥ ψ
00, the signal’s precision (conditional on ψA ≥ ψ
00) plays no role.24
22Note that the signal sA i st h es a m ef o rb o t hﬁrms, given our assumption in Section 2 that the state
of nature reﬂects technological uncertainty which applies equally to all ﬁrms.
23Recall our previous requirement that if both ﬁrms face identical ﬁnancing conditions, then the equi-
librium outcome should also be symmetric.
24This is admittedly an artefact of our restriction to discrete investment levels. If investment levels were
continuous, an increase in ψA would likely lead to a higher investment after observing a good signal, even
without competition.
21Suppose next that, as in Lemma 3, only one ﬁrm, n, is ﬁnanced by an active investor.
To support a long-run asymmetric outcome, condition (20) must still hold, as otherwise
an early investment of In
1 = κl + κh + κH would not forestall future investment by its
rival, ﬁrm n0. As condition (20) applies only to continuation proﬁts from t =2onwards,
it is not aﬀected by the signal’s precision. However, to make it proﬁtable for ﬁrm n to
“strategically overinvest” early on, it must additionally hold that25
ψA ≥ ψ
000,w h e r e
1+ψ
000
1 − ψ
000 =
1 − μ0
μ0
κH
Λ1u + Λ2
4
9τ(u +3 τ) − κH
. (28)
Hence, if only ﬁrm n is ﬁnanced by an active investor, then, for a long-run asymmetric
outcome to obtain, both (20) and (28) must hold, where the latter condition replaces
(19).26 G i v e nt h a t( 2 8 )i sm o r el i k e l yt ob es a t i s ﬁed the higher is ψA, we have:
Lemma 5 Suppose that ψA ≥ ψ
00. If only one ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by an active investor, then
an increase in the signal’s precision ψA makes it more likely that the long-run outcome is
asymmetric, while if both ﬁrms are ﬁnanced by active investors, a change in ψA (conditional
on ψA ≥ ψ
00) has no eﬀect.
W en e x tt u r nt ot h ec a s ew h e r et h ec h o i c eo fo u t s i d eﬁnancing is endogenous. Suppose
ﬁr s tt h a to n l yo n eﬁrm, n = a, has access to active investors, as in Proposition 4. Whether
it is optimal for ﬁrm a to choose an active investor depends on how the cost of information
acquisition k compares with the value of (early) information. Regardless of whether the
long-run outcome is symmetric or asymmetric (the two possible cases in Proposition 4),
the value of information to ﬁrm a is increasing in the signal’s precision ψA.I f e i t h e r
(20) or (28) does not hold, so that the long-run outcome is symmetric, then the value of
information is the same as without competition and thus given by the sum of (6) and (7).
By inspection, both terms are increasing in ψA. On the other hand, if both (20) and (28)
hold, so that the long-run outcome is asymmetric, then the value of information is given
25This condition is obtained by substituting for μg in κH ≤ μg
£
Λ1u + Λ2u 4
9τ(u +3 τ)
¤
. Also, note that
generally ψ
000 and ψ
00 cannot be compared, implying that our restriction to ψA ≥ ψ
00 neither precludes nor
implies that ψA ≥ ψ
000.
26Conditions (21) and (22) are still suﬃcient to rule out cases where the rival ﬁrm n0 overinvests early
on, or where there is a long-run asymmetric outcome despite symmetric investment strategies in t =1 .
22by the sum of (6) and
μ0
1+ψA
2
∙
2Λ1u + Λ2u
4
9τ
(u +3 τ)
¸
−(1−μ0)
1 − ψA
2
κh−
∙
μ0
1+ψA
2
+( 1− μ0)
1 − ψA
2
¸
κH,
(29)
which is again increasing in ψA.27
Proposition 8 Suppose that ψA ≥ ψ
00.I f o n l y o n e ﬁrm has access to active investors,
then the value of information to that ﬁrm is strictly increasing in the signal’s precision
ψA, implying that the ﬁrm is more likely to choose an active investor the higher is ψA.
Together, Lemma 5 and Proposition 8 imply that if only one ﬁrm has access to active
investors, then, as the signal’s precision ψA increases, it becomes more likely that i) the
ﬁrm indeed chooses an active investor, and ii) this forestalls future investment by the ﬁrm’s
rival, leading to a long-run asymmetric outcome.
Suppose ﬁnally that both ﬁrms have access to active investors. In this case, the eﬀect
of an increase in ψA on the long-run outcome is ambiguous. To see this, note ﬁrst that, as
is immediate from our previous discussion, the higher is ψA, the less likely it is that both
ﬁrms choose passive investors. On the other hand, if one ﬁrm chooses an active investor,
then the value to the other ﬁrm from also choosing an active investor is increasing in ψA.
Formally, this value is given by the sum of (6), which captures the value from discontinuing
the venture after observing sA = b,a n d
μ0
1+ψA
2
∙
2Λ1u + Λ2u
4
9τ
(3τ − u) − κh
¸
− (1 − μ0)
1 − ψA
2
κh, (30)
where both (6) and (30) are increasing in ψA.
5. Discussion
5.1. Heterogeneity across ﬁrms
Whether a ﬁrm chooses an active investor depends, next to the value of information,
on the costs of information acquisition k. In reality, these costs may vary across ﬁrms if
27Note that the diﬀerence between (29) and (7), which transforms to
2
μ0(1 + ψA)+( 1− μ0)(1 − ψA)
∙
μg
∙
Λ1u + Λ2u
4
9τ
(u +3 τ)
¸
− κH
¸
,
is strictly positive if ψA ≥ ψ
000.
23they depend on the geographic proximity between ﬁrms and their investors. Alternatively,
some ﬁrms may be more opaque than others, making it more costly to obtain information.
It is straightforward to extend our model to heterogeneous information acquisition costs
kn for ﬁrms n = a,b. The case analyzed in Proposition 4, in which only ﬁrm a has access
to active investors, can then be viewed as a special case with kb = ∞. Given Propositions
5 to 7, the following result is immediate.
Proposition 9 Suppose both ﬁr m sh a v ea c c e s st oa c t i v ei n v e s t o r s ,b u tﬁrm a has a lower
information acquisition cost than ﬁrm b, i.e., ka ≤ kb. If (19) and (20) hold but (26) does
not hold, then either ﬁrm chooses an active investor if kn is smaller than (23). If either
(19) or (20) does not hold, then either ﬁrm chooses an active investor if kn is smaller than
(24). Finally, if (19), (20), and (26) jointly hold, then:
i) both ﬁrms choose active investors if kb is smaller than (24);
ii) both ﬁrms choose passive investors if ka is larger than (25);
iii) ﬁrm a chooses an active investor while ﬁrm b chooses a passive investor if either ka is
smaller than (24) and kb is larger than (24), or if ka lies between (24) and (25) while kb
is larger than (25).
Introducing heterogeneity in the costs of information acquisition enlarges the scope
for asymmetric outcomes. Previously, if either (19), (20), or (26) did not hold, then the
outcome was necessarily symmetric in that both ﬁrms either chose active investors or
passive investors (Propositions 5 and 7, respectively). As Proposition 9 shows, if there is
heterogeneity in information acquisition costs, then the outcome may well be asymmetric
in these cases.
Heterogeneity across ﬁrms may also result from timing diﬀerences. Even if both ﬁrms
have potentially access to active investors, if ﬁrm a was founded prior to ﬁrm b, it has a
ﬁrst-mover advantage by being the ﬁrst to choose an active investor, thus forestalling ﬁrm
b’s future investment and growth. Given Propositions 5 to 7, this is the case whenever
there are asymmetric equilibria in the corresponding simultaneous-move game.
Proposition 10 If ﬁrm a can choose an active investor before ﬁrm b, and if this choice
is observable, then being the ﬁrst beneﬁts ﬁrm a i fa n do n l yi ft h e r ee x i s ta s y m m e t r i c
equilibria in the corresponding simultaneous-move ﬁnancing game.
245.2. Learning curves, economies of scale, and network eﬀects
There are natural circumstances in which we would expect that the long-run beneﬁts
from “strategically overinvesting” early on are even higher than described here, reinforc-
ing our main results and underscoring the strategic importance of active investors. For
brevity’s sake, we will conﬁne ourselves to three examples.
Learning Curves: Suppose ﬁrms have marginal production costs cn
t , where the production
cost cn
2 in t =2is decreasing in the amount produced in t =1 . To enrich the model
further, we could think of a non-degenerate (but realistic) pricing problem in which the
quantity xn
1 sold in t =1depends not only on the price but also (positively) on the good’s
quality, which in turn depends on the investment In
1. By investing more early on, a ﬁrm
can therefore move down faster the “manufacturing learning curve,” resulting in lower
marginal costs in future periods and reinforcing the long-run beneﬁts from “strategically
overinvesting” early on.
When we introduce time-dependent marginal costs cn
2 into our Hotelling model, we
have that ﬁrm n realizes equilibrium proﬁts in t =2of
π
n =
Λ2
τ
µ
τ +
(un
2 − cn
2)
3
−
(un0
2 − cn0
2 )
3
¶2
. (31)
(Compare this expression to (13).) Likewise, in analogy to (14), the beneﬁts to ﬁrm n
from a marginal increase in un
2 are
2
3τ
Λ2
µ
τ +
(un
2 − cn
2)
3
−
(un0
2 − cn0
2 )
3
¶
, (32)
which is decreasing in the ﬁrm’s own marginal cost cn
2 and increasing in the rival’s marginal
cost cn0
2 .
Installed Base: A similar insight obtains if we allow ﬁrms to invest not only in the
quality of their products but also in the production capacity and technology. In the IO
literature, a common way of modelling this is to assume that ﬁrms have quadratic pro-
duction costs c2/k,w h e r ek denotes previously invested capital. Given this speciﬁcation,
ﬁrm n’s marginal costs in t =2are then 2c/kn
2,w h e r ekn
2 = In
1 +In
2.L i k ea b o v e ,m a r g i n a l
costs in t =2are thus decreasing in the amount invested in t =1 , reinforcing the long-run
beneﬁts from “strategically overinvesting” early on.
25Network Externalities: If there are network eﬀects, a consumer’s utility in a given
period depends on the number of all other buyers of the same product. If the good is
durable or, in the case of services, if there are switching costs (exogenous or endogenous
via contractual lock-in), then a ﬁrm that makes a higher investment early on (and therefore
has more customers early on) can raise the value of its goods in future periods, reinforcing
the long-run beneﬁts from “strategically overinvesting” early on.
As these examples suggest, the mechanism analyzed in this paper may be particu-
larly important for newly developing, high-innovation industries such as the information
technology and communication industries. For instance, steep learning curves and intense
competition due to lack of horizontal diﬀerentiation (despite ongoing branding eﬀorts) are
often described as being typical of the chip industry. In a similar vein, internet trading
platforms appear to exhibit considerable network externalities, while internet browsers are
often associated with consumer lock-in eﬀects and switching inertia.
6. Empirical implications
Our model is best descriptive of new risky ventures that have relatively little chance of
success ex ante,a si sr e ﬂected in our basic assumption that the ex-ante success probability
μ0 is suﬃciently low. For such ventures, our model shows that there are beneﬁts to being
ﬁnanced by “active” investors, such as venture capitalists (VCs). The following implication
summarizes beneﬁts that materialize even if new ventures do not compete with each other
on the product market.
Implication 1. New ventures ﬁnanced by active investors are more likely to receive
higher funding and to make higher investments early on, but they are also more likely to
be terminated earlier, than new ventures ﬁnanced by passive investors.
N o t et h a tt h ei n v e s t m e n tg a pi nI m p l i c a t i o n1p e r t a i n so n l yt oearly investments. In
the absence of “strategic overinvestment”, which occurs only in a competitive context, new
ventures ﬁnanced by passive investors will eventually catch up. If new ventures compete
with each other on the product market, however, then a new venture ﬁnanced by an
active investor may be able to credibly commit to “strategically overinvest” early on, thus
forestalling its rivals’ future investment and growth.
26Implication 2. If new ventures compete with each other on the product market, then
those ﬁnanced by active investors are likely to make even higher investments early on, as
well as higher total long-run investments, compared to the case without competition, while
those ﬁnanced by passive investors are likely to invest even less in the long run.
In a recent empirical study, Hege et al. (2007) document that VCs in the U.S. play
a more active role than their European counterparts. Consistent with our results, the
authors ﬁnd that VC investments in the U.S. are on average twice as large as in Europe,
while VCs in the U.S. appear to “react with an increased funding ﬂow upon good early
performance, in contrast to Europeans” (p. 31). In another empirical study, Puri and
Zarutskie (2007) compare VC- and non-VC-backed investments in the U.S. Consistent
with our results, the authors ﬁnd that VC-backed ventures make larger investments than
their non-VC-backed counterparts, although prior to receiving funding, VC-ﬁnanced ﬁrms
do not look diﬀerent from non-VC ﬁnanced ﬁrms.
In our model, investments are made to improve the product quality, which in turn
l e a d st oh i g h e rm a r k e ts h a r e sa n dﬁrm growth. The following implication is a corollary to
Implication 2.
Implication 3. If new ventures compete with each other on the product market, then
those ﬁnanced by active investors are likely to have higher growth, higher market shares,
and higher proﬁts in the long run than those ﬁnanced by passive investors.
Implication 3 has interesting cross-country implications. If new ventures in one country
have better access to active, well-informed investors than new ventures in another country,
and if they all compete on a global product market, then, over the long pull, those from the
“better-access” country are likely to dominate their rivals in terms of investment, growth,
and global market shares. In the Introduction, we have already alluded to the commonly
held perception that the supply of active, well-informed VCs is better in the U.S. than in
Europe. (See, e.g., Schwienbacher (2005), who ﬁn d st h a tE u r o p e a nV C sa r el e s sa c t i v e l y
involved and monitor less than their U.S. counterparts.) In this vein, Implication 3 also
sheds light on some recent ﬁndings by Bartelsman et. al. (2007), who ﬁnd that, while
entry and exit rates are similar in the U.S. and Europe, post-entry growth is much higher
in the U.S. (see also Aghion et al., 2007).
27A key feature of our model is that an increase in product market competition increases
the beneﬁts from “strategically overinvesting” early on.
Implication 4. New ventures ﬁnanced by active investors are more likely to have a long-
run advantage in terms of total investment, market shares, and proﬁts if competition in
the product market is more intense.
As discussed in Section 5.2, the incentives to make a strategically high investment early
on are reinforced if investing early entails additional beneﬁts.
Implication 5. The potential long-run advantage of new ventures ﬁnanced by active
investors is more pronounced in the presence of learning curves, economies of scale, and
network externalities.
Our model also provides conditions for when we should observe that a given ﬁrm
chooses an active investor, provided that it has access to such an investor pool.
Implication 6. A new venture is more likely to choose an active investor if the investor’s
information is more precise (ψA), if the loss from wrongly continuing a bad venture is
higher (κl), and if the immediate proﬁts from early investments are higher (Λ1u). If
choosing an active investor creates a long-run competitive advantage, then a new venture
is additionally more likely to choose an active investor if the long-run market size is bigger
(Λ2) and if the costs of upgrading to the highest quality level are lower (κH).
Our model has also implications for new ventures that face identical access to active
investors. Hence, it also applies to new ventures within the same county or geographic
region. Precisely, our model shows that despite facing identical access conditions, some
new ventures may (endogenously) end up with active investors, while others may end up
with passive investors. Importantly, the former will have an advantage over the latter in
the long run. Hence, even if all new ventures have the same access to active investors,
there may be dispersion in long-run outcomes.
Implication 7. Even if all new ventures have the same access to active investors, there
may be long-run dispersion in investment, market shares, and proﬁts.
A si ss h o w ni nC o r o l l a r y4a n dP r o p o s i t i o n9 ,l o n g - r u nd i s p e r s i o ni no u t c o m e si sm o r e
likely if competition in the product market is more intense and if new ventures exhibit
28heterogenous information acquisition costs, e.g., because some new ventures are more
opaque than others.
Implication 8. A long-run asymmetric outcome, even if all new ventures have the same
access to active investors, is more likely if competition in the product market is more
intense and if new ventures have heterogeneous costs of information acquisition.
7. Concluding remarks
We model a dynamic investment game to examine the interaction between outside ﬁ-
nancing and product market competition. We show that the lack of access to actively
involved, hands-on investors such as VCs can constitute an obstacle to ﬁrm growth, es-
pecially if other ﬁrms that are being ﬁnanced by such investors “prey” on their rivals by
“strategically overinvesting” early on. Our model predicts that new ventures ﬁnanced by
active investors will dominate their industry peers in the long run. Industries in which
such “strategic overinvestment” is more likely to be proﬁtable are highly competitive in-
dustries as well as industries in which early investments have persistent eﬀects, e.g., due
to learning curves, economies of scope, and network eﬀects.
An interesting avenue for future research is to explore what alternatives new ven-
tures without access to VC ﬁnancing might have to mitigate their strategic disadvantage.
One alternative might be to seek ﬁnancing from corporate venture capitalists, as in Hell-
mann (2002). Another alternative might be to change the ﬁrm’s organizational form, e.g.,
through vertical integration or strategic alliances, as in Fulghieri and Sevilir (2004).
We would like to conclude with a caveat. If business creation in knowledge-intensive
industries involves local externalities, e.g., through knowledge spillover and the spawning
of new ﬁrms, then this might provide a justiﬁcation for policy intervention. In the area
of risk capital, the pressure on governments to intervene has been particularly strong in
Europe, given the many success stories of VC-backed companies in the U.S. Responding to
this pressure, European governments have launched a number of programs to stimulate the
provision of risk capital.28 However, our model implies that even a large subsidy to passive
investors will not change the slower pace at which ﬁrms ﬁnanced by these investors grow,
28Following the example of the Small Business Innovation Research program in the U.S., which awards
grants to technology-intensive small ﬁrms, several European countries have implemented similar schemes,
e.g., the UK High Technology Fund in 2003, the Danish Growth Fund in 2001, or the French OSEO in
29unless the subsidy is so large that the passive investors indiscriminately make higher
investments early on. That is, even if there is only a small likelihood that the venture
is promising, passive investors would always have to make a high investment early on.
Clearly, the ﬂip side of this are massive investments into unpromising ventures.
Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .F r o mr e w r i t i n g( 5 )w eh a v et h a tc h o o s i n gI1 = κl and I2 = κh if
θ = g is (weakly) more proﬁtable than choosing I1 = κl + κh (and thus also I2 =0 )i fμs
satisﬁes
μs ≥ μ
00 :=
κh
κh + Λ1u
. (33)
I ft h ec o n v e r s eo f( 3 3 )h o l d ss t r i c t l y ,t h e nI1 = κl + κh is instead strictly optimal.
Next, investing I1 = κl instead of discontinuing the venture (I1 =0 )i si nt u r n( w e a k l y )
more proﬁtable if μs [Λ1u +2 Λ2u − κh] − κl > 0, which transforms to
μs >μ
0 :=
κl
Λ1u +2 Λ2u − κh
. (34)
(Note that the denominator is necessarily strictly positive if it was ex-ante eﬃcient to
invest I0 ≥ 0 in t =0 .) That μ00 >μ 0 follows ﬁnally as κh ≥ κl and as Λ2u>κholds from
(3). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. We ﬁrst rewrite condition (33) from the proof of Lemma
1f o rs = g. Substituting from the deﬁnition of μg, investing I1 = κl + κh is then more
proﬁtable than investing ﬁrst only I1 = κl if
1+ψ
1 − ψ
≥
1 − μ0
μ0
κh
Λ1u
. (35)
Imposing equality in (35) yields a threshold 0 <ψ
00 < 1.
For s = b we have from (34) and after substituting from the deﬁnition of μb that I1 =0
is (weakly) more proﬁtable than I1 = κl if
1+ψ
1 − ψ
≥
μ0
1 − μ0
µ
Λ1u +2 Λ2u − κl − κh
κl
¶
. (36)
2005. Measures targeted directly at VCs include the use of tax-exempt investment vehicles such as the
Fonds Commun de Placement Innovation (1997) in France or the Venture Capital Trust (1995) in the UK.
Moreover, lower capital gains tax rates were introduced, for instance, in Germany in 1998 and 2000.
30Imposing equality in (36) yields a threshold 0 <ψ
0 < 1.
We ﬁnally compare the two derived thresholds ψ
0 and ψ
00.F o rψ
00 ≥ ψ
0 to be satisﬁed
it must hold that
µ
μ0
1 − μ0
¶2
≤
µ
κh
Λ1u
¶µ
κl
Λ1u +2 Λ2u − κl − κh
¶
, (37)
which imposes an upper boundary on μ0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. Using from (37) that ψ
0 <ψ
00 holds for low μ0,t a k en o w
ﬁrst the case where ψ
0 <ψ . From Proposition 1 the additional information allows to
(optimally) discontinue the venture after observing s = b.I fs = b is generated by θ = b,
which happens with probability (1+ψ)/2, then the additional value adds a value equal to
the otherwise incurred investment cost κl. Otherwise, i.e., if s = b is generated by θ = g,
which happens with probability (1 − ψ)/2, then the erroneous shut-down of the project
leads to a (relative) destruction of value Λ1u +2 Λ2u − κl − κh. In expectation, the value
of information is thus
(1 − μ0)
1+ψ
2
κl − μ0
1 − ψ
2
(Λ1u +2 Λ2u − κl − κh), (38)
which transforms into (6).
For ψ>ψ
00 the more precise information leads, in addition, to a reversal of the decision
after observing s = g.I nc a s es = g is generated by θ = g, the added value from investing
I1 = κl + κh instead of only I1 = κl equals Λ1u.I f s = g is generated, instead, by
θ = b, then the additional investment cost κh are incurred erroneously. In expectation the
additional value of information in case of ψ>ψ
00 is then
μ0
1+ψ
2
Λ1u − (1 − μ0)
1 − ψ
2
κh, (39)
which transforms into (7). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .Without a strictly positive payment to the entrepreneur in
case no cash ﬂow is generated, it is clearly not possible to truthfully extract information
such that I1 =0is only chosen for sE = b.W es h o wn e x tt h a ti ti sa l s on o tp o s s i b l et o
ensure that I1 = κl + κh is chosen if and only if sE = g.
We argue to a contradiction. Consider thus a message game where b sE = g induces
I1 = κl + κh , while b sE = b leads to I1 = κl. The message also pins down the sharing
31rules for the subsequent payoﬀs. For the purpose of this proof, we simplify the notation by
denoting the total expected payoﬀ of the entrepreneur in case of θ = g by R(b sAE). Under
truthtelling, “type” sE = b thus realizes the payoﬀ μbR(b)+γ (κl + μbκh). To ensure
incentive compatibility, this payoﬀ must not be smaller than the payoﬀ obtained when
sending instead the message b sE = g, which equals μbR(g)+γ(κl +κh). We can transform
this condition into the requirement that
κh ≤
1
γ
μb
1 − μb
[R(b) − R(g)]. (40)
Proceeding likewise for sE = g, we have in this case the incentive compatibility con-
straint
κh ≥
1
γ
μg
1 − μg
[R(b) − R(g)]. (41)
Clearly, whenever the signal is informative as ψE > 0, implying that μg >μ b,t h et w o
conditions (40) and (41) can not be jointly satisﬁed.
Note next that from (5) investing I1 = κl +κh is not eﬃcient given the prior π0, while
f r o m( 3 )i ti so p t i m a lt oi n v e s tI2 = κh in case q1 = l and θ = g.A sb yo p t i m a l i t yf o rt h e
entrepreneur the investor’s break-even constraint (8) will be satisﬁed just with equality,
making the entrepreneur the full residual claimant, it is thus clearly also optimal to choose
the eﬃcient investment path (though only based on the prior beliefs μ0). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3 Note ﬁr s tt h a ti ti sn o te ﬃcient that the active investor
acquires information if either ψA ≤ ψ
0,o rψ
0 <ψ A ≤ ψ
00 and not
(1 − μ0)
1+ψA
2
κl − μ0
1 − ψA
2
(Λ1u +2 Λ2u − κl − κh) ≥ k, (42)
or if ψA >ψ
00 and not
μ0 [ψAΛ1u − (1 − ψA)Λ2u]+κl
1
2
(1 + ψA − 2μ0ψA) − κh
1
2
(1 − ψA)(1− 2μ0) ≥ k, (43)
where we made use of Corollary 1, while summing up (38) and (39) to obtain (43).
If the active investor does not acquire information, then the analysis is identical to that
in Proposition 2. In particular, the contract could then prescribe I1 = κl as well as any σt
so as to satisfy (8). (Note also that I2 = κh can simply be contractually stipulated as the
realization of θ = g is veriﬁable in t =1 .)
32We next assume that ψA ≤ ψ
00 and that (42) holds strictly. If the investor acquires
information and if the eﬃcient investment decision I1 as characterized in Proposition 1 is
followed, then the investor’s break-even constraint is given by (9) in the main text. Note
next that in this case the investor indeed prefers the eﬃcient choice of I1. This follows
from the following two observations. First, for sA = b it is eﬃcient not to continue and
as the investor would, otherwise, have to bear all investment costs, I1 =0is clearly also
privately optimal. Second, at sA = g it is likewise not privately optimal to invest κl + κh
given that this is not eﬃcient and as the additional costs κh would be born by the investor.
Finally, if it was then privately optimal to choose I1 =0 , then the break-even constraint
(9) could clearly not be satisﬁed.
For ψA ≤ ψ
00 it thus remains to consider the investor’s incentives to acquire information
in the ﬁrst place. Shirking can clearly only be optimal if subsequently I1 = κl is chosen,
in which case the investor realizes
μ0 (σ1Λ1u + σ22Λ2u − κl − κh) − (1 − μ0)κl. (44)
C o m p a r i n gt h i st o( 9 ) ,w et h u sh a v ea f t e rr e a r r a n g i n gt e r m st h ei n c e n t i v ec o n s t r a i n t
(1 − μ0)
1+ψA
2
κl − μ0
1 − ψA
2
(σ1Λ1u + σ22Λ2u − κl − κh) ≥ k, (45)
which is implied by condition (42) as σt ≤ 1. Summing up, we have thus found that
if ψA ≤ ψ
00 and if (42) holds, then any contract satisfying (9) also induces information
acquisition and the eﬃcient investment choice. From optimality for the ﬁrm, (9) is then
satisﬁed with equality, which if (42) holds strictly also implies that the ﬁrm strictly prefers
to induce information acquisition.
The ﬁn a lc a s ei st h a tw h e r eψA >ψ
00 and where (43) holds strictly. Note here that we
can from the arguments in the main text restrict consideration to the analysis of the case
where the investor’s discretion over the investment in t =1is not restricted. Provided that
i n f o r m a t i o ni su s e dt oi m p l e m e n tt h ee ﬃcient investment path, the break-even constraint
for the investor is then given by (10). As in the case of ψA ≤ ψ
00, we can next conclude
that, ﬁrst, the investor prefers I1 =0to any other investment level when observing sA = b
and that, second, he does not prefer I1 =0when observing sA = g.
For sA = g, the investor prefers I1 =2 κ over I1 = κ if
£
μg2u(σ1Λ1 + σ2Λ2) − κl − κh
¤
≥ μg [u(σ1Λ1 +2 σ2Λ2) − κh] − κl, (46)
33which after substituting for μg transforms to (11). Note that from (5) it follows that
condition (11) holds surely if σ1 is suﬃciently close to one.
To consider the incentives to acquire information, note ﬁrst that the investor prefers
I1 = κl if he receives no information.29 Consequently, he exerts eﬀo r to n l yi f( 1 0 )d o e s
not fall short of (44) minus I0, which yields condition (12). It is also useful to note that
constraint (12) is implied by condition (43) if
(1 − ψA)(1 − σ2)Λ2u>ψ AΛ1u(1 − σ1). (47)
We conclude the analysis by showing that it is indeed possible to ﬁnd sharing rules
such that all three (remaining) constraints are satisﬁed simultaneously, i.e., (10), (11), and
(12). As information acquisition is eﬃcient and as any increase in σ1 or σ2 relaxes (10),
this would only be the case if (10) does not hold in case we substitute σ1 =1and the
highest value for σ2 > 0 for which (12) would still be satisﬁed. But this case can not arise
as we know from (47) that (43) implies (12) in case σ1 =1 . Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . Note ﬁrst that from ψA =1and Λ1 > 0 we can restrict
consideration to investments in t =1 , while also In
1 =0holds if sA = b.I fﬁrms end up
with symmetric qualities, then in case of θ = g they realize in t =2proﬁts of τΛ2.T o
support an equilibrium with In
1 = κl + κh for both ﬁrms, note that a deviation to a lower
investment of In
1 = κl is not proﬁtable if the sum of the thereby saved investment cost
κh and of the new, lower revenues Λ1u + Λ2
τ
¡
τ − u
3
¢2 does not exceed 2Λ1u + τΛ2.T h i s
obtains the condition
κh ≤ Λ1u + Λ2u
1
9τ
[6τ − u], (48)
which given u<3
2τ from (16) must hold from (17) even if Λ1 =0 . Next, a deviation to
a higher investment level by spending, in addition, κH is also not proﬁtable if the new
revenues of 3Λ1u + Λ2
τ
¡
τ + u
3
¢2 minus the additional investment cost κH do not exceed
2Λ1u + τΛ2. This transforms to the requirement that
κH ≥ Λ1u + Λ2u
1
9τ
[6τ + u]. (49)
29Note that as this is out of equilibrium, it need not be the case that the investor’s expected payoﬀ is
then strictly positive. Also, note that from (5), which implies that
μ0
1−μ0σ1 < κh
Λ1u, it is immediate that
the investor prefers I1 = κl to I1 = κh + κh.
34To see that (49) is implied by (15) we can again use that u<3
2τ holds from (16).
We next rule out an asymmetric equilibrium where only one ﬁrm, n0, invests κl+κh.I f
the other ﬁrm, n, chooses In
1 = κl and thus realizes proﬁts of Λ2
τ
¡
τ − u
3
¢2 −κl,ad e v i a t i o n
to In
1 = κl +κh is strictly proﬁtable in case (48) holds, which we already showed to be the
case. If instead n is supposed to choose In
1 = κl +κh +κH,t h e nar e d u c t i o nb yκH is now
strictly proﬁtable from (49).
We ﬁnally derive the conditions for when we can support an asymmetric equilibrium
with qn
t = l and qn0
t = H.I fn0 wants to deviate, then from the previous observations the
best alternative choice is to choose In0
1 = κl + κh. To render this unproﬁtable, the saved
costs κH must not exceed the revenues gained, i.e., the diﬀerence of 3Λ1u + Λ2
τ
¡
τ +2u
3
¢2
and 2Λ1u + Λ2τ, which yields condition (19). (Note that after the deviation both ﬁrms
e n du pw i t hqn
2 = qn0
2 = h.)
Turning to ﬁrm n,b yt h ep r e v i o u so b s e r v a t i o n st h en e x tb e s ta l t e r n a t i v et oc h o o s i n g
In
1 = κl is to choose instead In
1 = κl + κh. To render this unproﬁtable, the additionally
incurred costs κh must not be smaller than the revenues gained, i.e., the diﬀerence of
2Λ1u + Λ2
τ
¡
τ − u
3
¢2 and Λ1u + Λ2
τ
¡
τ − 2u
3
¢2, which yields condition (18). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .We turn ﬁrst to the strategies in t =2 ,p r o v i d e dθ = g.W e
know from Lemma 2 that in an equilibrium with qn
2 = h it must likewise hold that qn0
2 = h.
Suppose next that qn
2 = H and qn0
1 = l. For the optimal choice of In0
2 note ﬁr s tt h a tw ec a n
again rule out optimality of In0
2 = κh+κH, while In0
2 = κh is only (weakly) optimal in case
κh ≤ Λ2u 1
3τ (2τ − u). As the converse of this must hold weakly to support an asymmetric
outcome in the long run, we obtain from this condition (20).
Suppose now ﬁrst that (20) holds. In this case, if ﬁrm n with an active investor chooses
qn
1 = H, then it is indeed optimal for ﬁrm n0 to choose qn0
1 = qn0
2 = l.( N o t et h a tw eu s e
from (5) that the ﬁrm would optimally choose a higher investment not before t =2 ,w h i c h
by (20) is, however, not proﬁtable.) To support the asymmetric equilibrium, it thus only
remains to show that the strategy of ﬁrm n is optimal. As in the proof of Lemma 2, the
optimal deviating strategy would be to qn
1 = h, which is not optimal if (19) holds.
Suppose next that either (19) or (20) do not hold, in which case we can not support the
previously constructed asymmetric outcome. In this case, ﬁrm n with an active investor
would thus not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate from In
1 = κl + κh and In
2 =0 ,p r o v i d e dt h a t
ﬁrm n0 does not end up with higher quality than qn0
2 = h. Given the strategy of ﬁrm
35n, from our previous results it thus only remains to determine whether ﬁrm n0 invests
gradually with In0
1 = κl and In0
2 = κh,w h i c hh o l d sf r o m( 5 ) .
Finally, conditions (21) and (22) rule out any other pure-strategy equilibria. A proof
of this result is contained in an earlier working paper version and is available from the
authors upon request. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.W et u r nﬁrst to the equilibrium candidate where both ﬁrms invest
gradually. In this case, the expected proﬁt for either ﬁrm equals μ0 [Λ1u + τ − κh] − κl.
To check when we can support this equilibrium, note that we need only consider devi-
ations in t =1 . Moreover, if some ﬁrm n deviates to In
1 = κl + κh,r e c a l lt h a tw ec a ns t i l l
support an equilibrium of the continuation game where In
2 =0and In0
2 = κh, implying
f r o m( 5 )t h a tp r o ﬁts of the deviating ﬁrm n =1would be lower. Consequently, it remains
to check for a deviation to In
1 = κl + κh + κH, which in turn can only be proﬁtable if
In0
2 =0and thus if (20) holds. In this case, ﬁrm n will still not deviate if
κH ≥ μ0u
∙
Λ1 + Λ2
4
9τ
[3τ + u]
¸
− (1 − μ0)κh. (50)
This condition is implied by (21) and (22), implying that a deviation is unproﬁtable for
ﬁrm n..
Finally, we can rule out any other pure-strategy equilibria. A proof of this result
i sc o n t a i n e di na ne a r l i e rw o r k i n gp a p e rv e r s i o na n di sa v a i l a b l ef r o mt h ea u t h o r su p o n
request. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.T h e ﬁrst part of the Proposition follows immediately from
Lemmas 3 and 4 after substituting ψA =1into Corollary 1, which yields (23). For the
second part we use from Lemma 3 that in case a obtains ﬁnance from an active investor,
then the long-run outcome will be asymmetric with qa
2 = H and qb
2 = l. The second
part of expression (24) captures then the (by assumption of the case strictly positive)
diﬀerence between the resulting proﬁts and the proﬁts obtained under ﬁnancing from a
passive investor (cf. Lemma 4) in case θ = g. (Note here that the diﬀerence in revenues
in t =2is equal to that of Λ2
τ
¡
τ + 2u
3
¢2 and Λ2τ. Q.E.D.
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